Third-party tracking is common on almost all commercially operated websites. Prior work has studied in detail the extent of thirdparty tracking on the web, detection of third-party trackers, and defending against third-party tracking. Existing research and tools have also attempted to inform web users of trackers and the extent of their privacy violations. However, existing tools do not take into account users' perceptions of and understanding of the extent of trackers on the web. Taking these factors into account is important for the usability of such tools so that users can be aware and protect themselves to a reasonable and necessary extent that aligns with their overall comfort with trackers.
INTRODUCTION
Third-party trackers (TPT) are present on almost every website [12] . TPTs allow websites to track their visitors across multiple digital services in order to serve more targeted content [29, 33] . While useful, these trackers induce privacy risks into the websites for its visitors.
Improving the detection of TPTs has been a topic of much investigation in the research community [19, 33] . Additionally, browser extensions-e.g., Ghostery, AdBlockPlus [3, 35] -detect tracking URLs or ads within a website and display them to the user, sometimes blocking the URLs from even being loaded. Previous work and existing tools have been useful to prevent advanced trackers from operating on websites and to inform users of how much tracking is occurring during their browsing; however, none of these tools are able to 1) quantify the privacy of a website according to what average users perceive to be sensitive or 2) inform these users of privacy-violating website components such that they can reasonably assess a website's privacy in comparison to other websites they visit.
In this paper, we take a step towards being able to quantify the privacy of a website in a user-centric way. We first conduct a * Authors contributed equally to this research. survey of 43 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk [4] asking participants about their awareness of different kinds of trackers, their comfort with these trackers, and for what purposes they would not be okay with a specific tracker being used by a website. Using the results of the survey, we implement a privacy scoring algorithm in a browser extension that determines which trackers are present on the page running the extension. The extension assigns higher or lower scores for different tracking components based on the comfort or allowance participants in the study overall reported with certain types of websites along with the amount of third parties operating the trackers on the page.
Our contributions, though preliminary, provide a proof-ofconcept system to quantify privacy in a way meaningful to users, and to empower users to assess their privacy on websites.
We next provide some background about TPTs (Sec. 2) and related work (Sec. 3). The following two sections describe both the user study and results (Sec. 4) and the design and implementation of the privacy scoring mechanism (Sec. 5). We conclude with limitations and future work (Sec. 6).
BACKGROUND ON TPTS
Third-party trackers (TPTs) are web components placed onto a webpage and tracked by an external domain. For example, a known website may include scripts from other domains who want to track users' behavior on that website, e.g., a TPT in the form of a cookie [1] .
In our work, we study the following eight categories of TPTs according to their purpose and functionality [35] :
(1) Session Replay: TPTs that track users' view (browser or screen output), user input (keyboard and mouse inputs), and logs of network events or console logs. (2) Adult advertising: TPTs that track users' browsing behavior on adult websites for adult ad retargeting and behavioral advertising. (3) Social media: TPTs that study users' browsing behavior on other websites to better target users on their social media platform. (4) Analytics: Most general-purpose TPTs that track website usage across different webpages. For example, these trackers may examine browsing behavior to empower cross-platform tracking or recording demographics information (e.g. age, gender, location).
(5) Advertising: TPTs that track users' browsing behavior on websites for ad retargeting and behavioral advertising. (6) Comments: TPTs that identify users in comment sections of webpages, including articles and product reviews. (7) Audio and video player: TPTs that track users' behavior when interacting with video and audio content. (8) Customer interaction: TPTs that enable e-commerce shops to assist users through a pop-up chat box when their mouse is idle while shopping online.
RELATED WORK
There has been a multitude of prior research studying third-party trackers and defenses against tracking. Many researchers have conducted longitudinal studies to study the extent of tracking on the web and the extent of overall privacyviolating web components [12, 13, 15, 18-21, 23-26, 28, 33] . Researchers have also developed a number of methodologies and tools for measuring tracking at this scale [11] . Beyond this, improving the detection of trackers has been an extensively studied topic [33] , also in the context of advertisements [8, 32] and privacy-violating web components in general [23] [24] [25] [26] .
There is also a large body of work aimed at implementing defenses against web tracking [33] . These methods range from privacy-preserving advertisements [14, 16, 37] to privacy protection on social media [10, 22, 34] .
With respect to the end-user, there have been a number of studies to understand users' perceptions of web tracking [9, 27, 30, 31, 36, 38] . Additionally, researchers have aimed to comprehensively quantify the privacy of websites and have built tools to usably inform users of violations [17] . These works serve as motivation for our work to design a privacy-quantifying system that takes the users' perceptions into account, which has not been studied before.
ELICITING USER PERCEPTIONS
In this section, we describe our user study to elicit user perceptions of trackers on different types of websites.
Methodology
To collect data about what types of tracking users are comfortable with on different websites, we conducted a survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk [4] (approved by our institution's ethics board). The survey roughly followed this pattern: for each TPT category described in Sec. 2, we constructed a scenario describing how companies use the TPTs in the category, without requiring any prior knowledge from the respondent. For each scenario, we asked participants 1) if they were aware of the type of tracking in the scenario, 2) about their comfort with knowing that the website runs this kind of tracking, and 3) which kind of websites they think should not use the tracking services described in the scenario (website categories described in Table 3 ). See App. A for the full survey.
The survey took less than ten minutes to complete and participants were compensated with $2.
Results
Our study had 43 participants. 56% of participants identified as male, the rest identifying as female. The ages of participants ranged from the 18-30 bracket to the 60+ bracket.
Due to the small sample size, we do not perform any statistical analyses on the responses to the survey. Furthermore, the primary purpose of the user data is to bootstrap the privacy scoring system (described in Sec. 5). However, we report some descriptive statistics of the survey results.
Looking at the number of participants who reported to be either "somewhat uncomfortable" or "very uncomfortable" with each type of tracker, we rank users' sensitivity to each category and use this ranking of sensitivity to assign a score to each category used to compute a privacy score (described later in Sec. 5). As we hypothesized, session replay is the type of TPT people are the least comfortable with and customer interaction was the TPT category users were most comfortable with. Table 1 shows the extent of unawareness for each TPT category. Again, as hypothesized, session replay was also the least known TPT. 
BUILDING A PRIVACY SCORING SYSTEM
In this section we describe a privacy scoring mechanism based on the results of the user study described in Section 4, wherein a higher privacy score implies a higher amount of privacy. The overall system has two components: a database server and a browser extension which computes the score.
Database server
The database server is built from user-elicited data and general information about websites and TPTs. The following describes the sets of data stored on the server:
• Categories of websites: The server returns one of 11 domain categories ( To populate this category mapping, we analyzed 49 safe-for-work websites from the Alexa top 50 sites list in November 2018 [2] and manually identified TPT URLs included within the page source. To classify domains, multiple authors browsed the internet normally for three days (recording visited URLs) and were able to manually label 122 distinct domains according to one of the 11 categories. We further analyzed the source of these 122 domain webpages to expand our list of TPT matches and ended up with 187 TPT URL patterns 1 in total.
Browser extension to compute the privacy score
The overall privacy score computed by the extension is based on users' comfort with the usage of different trackers in different contexts in addition to the extent of dispersion of user data within a page to third parties. First, the browser fetches the category of the domain from the server. Next, the browser requests a list of known TPT patterns and a list of blacklisted TPTs for the domain category. After fetching this information, the extension then identifies all HTTP requests made by the page that match any of the TPT URL patterns. A score is computed for each detected TPT. This TPT score is interpreted in the opposite direction of how the overall privacy score should be interpreted, i.e., the TPT score will be higher when the page contains a higher number of privacy-violating components or when users' data is being shared with a higher number of unique third parties, i.e., less privacy. The TPT score is calculated for each TPT URL by first making use of a base score assigned to the TPT's 1 We construct a URL pattern to be a regex matching a domain and optionally some part of the TPT URL's path. See Table 2 for examples of TPT patterns. Table 4 contains the listing of base scores for each TPT category based on the ranking of comfort described in Sec. 4. The TPT score is first initialized to the base score for the TPT category. If the TPT category is blacklisted for the domain category, the TPT score is increased by a factor of 1.5. The extension then checks if the company operating the TPT in question operating more than one TPT on the same web page. If so, we interpret the user's data to have a lower extent of dispersion (since this limits the amount of unique domains tracking user data) and decrease the TPT score by 1. The computed TPT scores for each TPT are then added together to form an aggregate TPT score for the page (aдд_score).
The extension sends aдд_score and the domain's category to the server. The server compares this score against 1) previously computed scores for all the other domains in the category of the domain in question and 2) previously computed scores for all domains seen before. We compute the following two percentile values based on the scores in the above two groups: categorical percentile:, i.e., the percentile of the browser-calculated score with respect to how many scores in the first category the calculated score is higher than (i.e., exhibits less privacy than); and a global percentile, i.e., similar to the categorical percentile except compared with the scores in the second category. The two percentile values are averaged and the final privacy score is computed by subtracting this average from 100, giving us a privacy score percentage between 1 and 100 (see Algorithm 1 for a full description).
The flow of the browser extension is shown in Figure 1 . App. B contains screenshots of the browser extension in action, which we named "Cookie Police". In addition to a score, the extension reports how the website compares to other websites in its category and other sites, as well as the companies operating trackers on the site.
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our work is subject to limitations due to limited resources and budget and therefore, lends to ample future work.
The sample size of survey respondents was not large enough to build a representative model of user perceptions used to compute privacy scores or to study small effects of statistical significance. Additionally, our respondents were all US residents. Future work should study perceptions of tracking privacy on a large scale, possibly even across countries, and build the scoring system based on more representative data. Alternatively, the score can be computed on an individual basis or on a population basis (e.g., per country), i.e., the score for one user or population is uniquely based on data collected by that user or population.
We assigned a category to a domain by manual labeling of a small set of domains. If the scoring extension is deployed in the wild, this manual categorization is not scalable. Future work should use an automatic categorization such as Amazon's Alexa Web Information Services (AWIS) [5] , SimilarWeb's Website Categorization API [7] , or Google's natural language content classification [6] and accordingly update the user study questions with the categories of interest. Furthermore, there is no existing database of recognized TPT URL patterns. Therefore, we use the labels produced by other tracking detection tools on a set of URLs as our ground truth for generating URL patterns. Future work could study how to automatically generate TPT-matching regular expressions from historical data and other tools, which automatically update over time. Additionally, the research community could benefit from collectively maintaining a public database of known TPT URL patterns implemented by various extensions.
The scoring algorithm is based on aggregate user perception. This lends to possible deviations from the perceptions of a specific user who might have outlying perceptions. Future work could implement such a scoring extension with a feedback mechanism, wherein users are able to provide feedback on certain aspects of the score or provide custom answers to some of the questions in the user study.
Future work should involve usability testing and a systematic evaluation of accuracy of a more sophisticated version of our tool. This would involve testing general usability, testing a feedback mechanism as mentioned above, evaluating the accuracy of the TPT filters and evaluating the extent of evasion of the TPT patterns in the wild. Related to this, future work should ensure that the detection of TPT URLs is comparable to the detection by state-ofthe-art tools (e.g. Ghostery) or should use the detection system employed by such tools either through any APIs or open-source implementations. ▷ % of previously seen domains (across users) in the category that agg_score is higher than 24: 25: дlob_percentile = computeGlobalPercentile(T PT [cateдory], aдд_score) ▷ % of all previously seen domains (across users) that agg_score is higher than 26: 27: privacy_score = 100 − (cat_percentile + дlob_percentile)/2 third-party tracking tools. These third-party tracking tools may be considered by some as "privacy-invasive". In the following pages, we will present you with 7 short scenarios explaining how each category of third-party tracking tools work. Following each scenario, we will ask how you feel about the use of such tools being used on websites that you might commonly visit. We will also ask you whether you think it is okay for some websites to use such tools or not.
You must be at least 18 years of age to take part in this survey.
A.1 Demographics
What gender do you identify with? 7) A website X includes social media Y's "share" button to let you share their website X's content to your social media Y profile. However, even if you choose not to "share" anything, by loading website X's page, social media Y knows that you are accessing website X. The next time you go on social media Y, they show ads based on the newfound fact that you visited website X. (8) A website X uses company Y's service to provide a comment/review section on their website. The next time you go on another website using company Y's service, you could be prevented from posting comments if you posted an "undesirable" comment (e.g. spam) before on website X.
A.3 Questions for each scenario
(1) Before reading the above scenario, were you aware that companies do this type of tracking? 
